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Roberto Esposti
* and Pierpaolo Pierani 
 
Abstract 
Public R&D stock is considered as quasi-fixed input in a variable cost function. Its shadow price 
allows to measure the long run optimal level thus explicitly assessing the hypothesis of under 
(over) investment. Two alternative R&D prices are defined depending on whether the social or 
private (farmers) view prevails. The results under these a lternatives provide evidence on the 
hypothesis that free-riding on public R&D explain overinvestment. The application to the Italian 
agriculture (1960-1995) suggests overinvestment in public research since the late seventies with a 
significant difference between the social and private optimal R&D, the former being much closer 
to the observed level.   
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1.  Introduction 
There is an old debate in both empirical and theoretical literature about the optimal Research 
and Development investment to be engaged by a firm, a sector or a country. The issue originally 
arose in the empirical productivity literature where, by adding the R&D stock to conventional 
growth accounting exercises, high rate of returns to R&D are reported (Griliches, 1992). In 
particular, the estimated returns at industry level are higher than the ones obtained at firm level 
(Terleckyj, 1980; Scherer, 10982; Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1984a, 1984b; Hall, 1996). This 
result is interpreted as evidence that private R&D investments generate positive externalities within 
the sector (technological spillovers) thus inducing social rates of return higher than private ones 
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(Nadiri, 1993; Cohen and Levin, 1991). It follows that, from a hypothetical social planner point of 
view, private R&D investment might be too little. 
This “under-investment hypothesis” and the empirical evidence supporting it have been 
strongly challenged in recent years by endogenous growth theorists (Jones, 1995; Jones and 
Williams, 1998; 2000). Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) consider incentives both to under- and over-investment in private research. If positive 
externalities (spillovers) generate under-investment, duplication of effort (congestion) and creative 
distruction (especially in non-competitive sectors) can induce firms to invest too much in R&D, at 
least from the social planner point of view (“too much of a good think”). New growth theorists also 
suggest that productivity growth models can be significantly biased and misleadingly support the 
under-investment hypothesis. Jones and Williams (1998; 2000) reconcile these two strands of 
research by showing how estimates of returns to R&D can be interpreted within endogenous 
growth models. In particular, their work demonstrates that standard productivity models might be 
misspecified in some respect and these models eventually end up in under-estimating the social rate 
of returns to private R&D.
1  
  However, the aforementioned arguments can be hardly referred to those sectors, like 
agriculture, where private R&D is negligible.
2 In these cases the under(over)investment issue takes 
a different economic meaning. When research investment is public responsibility, it is designed to 
behave, at least partially, as a free public good. Private firms (farmers) can then use it freely, 
though it is costly from the social point of view. Hence, the detection of under investment is a 
                                                             
1 By calibrating their theoretical model, Jones and Williams (1998) calculate how much the decentralised economy 
underinvest in private R&D: the optimal R&D investment would be at least four times greater than actual spending.       
2 In some case, this assumption about private R&D is too strong. In the US, for instance, private agricultural R&D is 
significant and also plays a role in the productivity growth assessment (Yee, 1992; Chavas et al., 1997). Moreover, it 
is always true that agriculture strongly use private R&D generated in other sectors (machinery, chemicals, drugs, etc.). 
However, if we consider this used private R&D as intersectoral spillovers (Johnson and Evenson, 1999; Esposti,   3
matter of perspective: the same level of public research expenditure can be scarce for private 
farmers and optimal (or excessive) from the social viewpoint, thus reverting the above arguments.      
In agricultural literature, the issue of underinvestment in public R&D has been largely 
investigated and discussed (Harris and Lloyd, 1991; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988) and the 
hypothesis supported by a number of empirical works (Echeverria, 1990; Schimmelpfenning et al., 
2000; Alston et al., 2000; Evenson, 2001). In adapting the conventional productivity analysis to the 
agricultural context, however, no particular attention has been paid to the dualism between private 
and social perspective in terms of public R&Dl. The conventional framework is actually 
appropriate to represent private (farmer) optimising behaviour that, however, would lead to an 
overestimation of R&D optimal level. If, more correctly, the social perspective has to be 
considered, then the specification of both the social planner investment behaviour and theoretical 
framework remain open questions. In this respect, the calculation of a proper social price of R&D 
is also critical.     
This paper aims at contributing to these issues by specifying an empirical production model 
that allows to estimate how much public R&D stock would be optimal from the private (farmers) 
and social perspective. By comparing these optimal levels with the actual stock, as well as the 
respective marginal rate of return, it is also possible to infer whether the public investor is mainly 
driven by private or social concerns
3. Section 2 summarises the theoretical micro-foundation of the 
approach; the econometric model is presented in section 3, together with the details on the 
calculation of the R&D social user cost. Section 4 applies the model to the specific case of Italian 
agriculture in 1960-1995. Section 5 concludes.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2002), it remains true that own private R&D in agriculture is usually much less than public R&D. This definitely holds 
in the Italian case, as will be detailed in next sections.      4
 
2.  Public R&D investment: microfoundations  
Thanks to developments in duality theory and flexible functional forms, production models can 
provide relevant information on the role of research in agriculture, particularly with respect to the 
issues of our concern (Mamuneas and Nadiri, 1996; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996a, 1996b; 
Morrison and Siegel, 1997, 1998; Nadiri and Kim, 1996; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Nadiri and 
Prucha, 1996). The quality of this information critically depends on the specification of agricultural 
technology and, consequently, how public research enters the model . 
In this study we maintain that farmers minimize the cost of producing a given level of 
output, conditional on input prices, stocks of quasi-fixed inputs and technological level. Under 
some regularity conditions, duality principles ensure consistency between variable costs and 
production functions, so that either one will describe the farming activity equally well (Chambers, 
1988). The restricted cost function is given by: 
(1)  ) , , (
* S X W G G =   
where G is the minimized variable cost W’V, W ”(W1, .., W N)’ is the price vector of variable 
inputs V ”(V 1, .., VN)’, X”(X1, .., XM)’ is the vector of quasi-fixed factors with user cost P”(P1, .., 
PM)’, and S is a vector of exogenous and/or predetermined variables
4. The latter includes output Y 
and time trend t, which is a proxy of exogenous technological level
5. 
In a number of studies, R&D appears among the elements of S; hence, likewise t, R&D would 
be fully exogenous (Morrison and Siegel, 1997, 1998). In this case, no adjustment to some long-run 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
3  We disregard here that there may be several different economic, social and political reasons behind public funding 
of agricultural research other than pursuing the social/private optimum. For a detailed review on this see Barnes 
(2001). 
4 The cost function is linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing and concave in W, non-decreasing in Y, non-increasing 
and convex in Z, non-negative, continuos and twice continuously differentiable in all its arguments. 
5 Here, we follow the working assumption that the ex post output equals the ex ante unobserved output.   5
optimal level takes place; therefore, neither the under(over)-investment hypothesis nor the relation 
between R&D adjustment and conventional inputs use can be really investigated. Alternatively, the 
R&D stock can be viewed as an element of X” ”(XP, XR), where X R is public research and XP the 
vector of the remaining quasi-fixed inputs. Under this hypothesis, the R&D stock becomes 
endogenous as an underlying investment behaviour lead the stock adjustment in the long run. This 
specification can measure the difference between observed and equilibrium public R&D stocks 
thus allowing to test the hypothesis of under (over) investment in agricultural research (Harris and 
Lloyd, 1991). Here, the key-element is the shadow price Z R=-¶G/¶XR, indicating the marginal 
contribution of R&D to the reduction of variable costs. As far as R&D behaves as the conventional 
inputs, the adjustment is price-driven since it will last until ZR=PR.  
However, this hypothetical long-run R&D investment rule rises one basic question: who is 
going to carry out this adjustment? From a private point of view, farmers minimise (1) and do not 
bear any cost for using the public research capital (i.e. for them PR=0) (Morrison and Schwartz, 
1996), hence in the long run they would demand R&D according to the behavioural rule ZR=PR=0. 
Decisions about public R&D investments, however, are taken by public institutions. From the 
social point of view, P R>0 (social cost or social price) and the R&D adjustment will follow the 
behavioural rule ZR=PR>0.
6 The social planner would minimise cost by considering both the public 
costs of the research and the private costs of the conventional inputs, and would invest in R&D to 
satisfy the long-run optimality condition G+ZP'XP+ZRXR =G+PP'X P+PRXR. The left hand side of 
this equality is the shadow total cost (C*), the right hand side is the actual total cost (C). In the 
short run, these total costs may differ and the ratio CUC=C*/C>1 (<1) indicates over(under)-
                                                             
6 Strictly speaking, ZR=PR is the long.-run optimal conditions only if the usual regularity conditions hold. In empirical 
papers (Mamuneas and Nadiri, 1996), these regularity conditions usually apply (or are imposed) to both conventional 
inputs and public R&D. For the latter, these regularity conditions implies monotonicity (=-(ZR=-¶G/¶XR>0) and   6
utilisation of the production capacity.  Therefore, we can distinguish between two different long-
run equilibria. In fact, while the short-run technology remains the same regardless the underlying 
R&D investment behaviour, the private rule (ZR=PR=0) and the public one (ZR=PR>0) can provide 
significantly different long-run equilibria. In this framework, it is, thus, possible to assess both 
whether the actual public R&D expenditure really follows this social planner rule and how far the 
current R&D stock provision ( R X ) is from the optimum (
*
R X ). 
Moreover, within this approach is possible to analyse the relationship between R&D and 
conventional inputs, as well as to compare the input response to R&D and exogenous technical 
change t. In fact, long run level of quasi-fixed inputs (public and private) depends on both variable 




k X (W,P,Y,t). In turn, however, the 
long run variable input demand “includes” the stocks adjustment, 
*
i V =Vi(W,X*(W,P,Y,t),Y,t). 
Variable inputs elasticities and the stocks elasticities themselves can be calculated (Pierani and 
Rizzi, 1994) to inform about these effects.  
Finally, public R&D prices also affect the marginal internal rate of return (MIRR) calculation. 
The real rate of return to public R&D is actually related to R&D shadow price in the short run, and 
therefore does not depend on the assumption P R=0. This shadow price, indeed, provides the 
marginal value of an unit increase in the R&D stock in the short run. Therefore, the MIRR is 


















where LR is the maximum length admitted for the investment effects and wn is the age/efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
convexity ¶ZR/¶XR=-(¶
2G/¶XR¶XR)<0. In this paper we will consider the regularity conditions as necessary also for 
R&D.     7
function of the research investment over the LR period (Esposti and Pierani, 2002). However, we 
can also calculate long-run returns, that is the IRR that would be observed if R&D were in 
equilibrium. As mentioned, these can significantly change according to the two hypothesises about 
PR. In the long run, R&D marginal value is its long run marginal productivity; therefore the MIRR 






















where  n t R n YRt X Y - - ¶ ¶ = ,
* ln ln e . In general terms, we expect an higher MIRR under P R>0 
than PR=0. More precisely, since the marginal productivity of R&D must be zero in the long run 
( n t R X Y - ¶ ¶ ,
* = 0) when PR=0, MIRR tends to –100% in the case of the private perspective, by 
definition. 
 
3.  The econometric model 
3.1. The variable cost function 
Empirically, we depict G
* by means of the Generalised Leontief (GL) form (Morrison, 
1988), because it is flexible, in the sense of providing a second-order approximation to an 
unknown function at any given point. The agricultural technology is described by an aggregate 
production function with constant returns to scale, three variable inputs (inputs for animals V A, 
inputs for crops V C, and labour V L), two quasi-fixed factors (physical capital X K and public 
research XR) and disembodied exogenous technical change t. The model estimated is:  
 (4)  [ ]
[ ]
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For econometric implementation, a set of cost-minimizing variable input demands can be   8
derived based on Shephard’s lemma. Here, optimal input-output coefficients are considered to 
reduce possible heteroskedasticity: 
(5)  Vi /Y = (1/Y)¶G(.)/¶Wi + ui     (i = A,C,L) 
System (5) contains all relevant parameters; hence, we needn’t provide an enlarged set of 
equations. However, greater efficiency in estimation can be gained by forcing more structure on 
the data, e.g., including additional information such as shadow value equations. The latter ones 
represent the potential reduction in variable cost from an additional unit of quasi-fixed input (-
¶G/¶Xk = Zk). Constant returns to scale allows equating the residual measure of returns to multiple 
quasi-fixed inputs (R=PYY-G, where PY is output price) with shadow fixed cost, ￿XjZj  (Morrison, 
1988). So, for estimation purposes, we have:  
(6)  -R = ¶G(.)/¶XK+¶G(.)/¶XR+ uR 
Parameter estimates are obtained using iterative Zellner techniques
7 under the typical 
assumption that ui and  uR vift are i.i.d. error terms.  
Based on estimated parameters and analytical expressions of derivatives, one can compute all 
the relevant measures concerning the technology of Italian agriculture. Moreover, we can calculate 
the MIRR to public research in the short and long run. Optimal level of R&D (
*
R X ) can be derived 
from the equality  ZR=PR. As we consider two quasi-fixed factors, long run stocks are obtained 
simultaneously by solving a system of two equations.  
 
3.2 The R&D price index 
In model (4), R&D price (i.e., user cost PR) plays a major role as it affects the desired level of 
R&D (Morrison and Schwartz, 1996). This user cost has two distinct dimension. Firstly, the   9
nominal R&D investments have to be correctly deflated to allow intertemporal comparison on a 
real base. This is the problem of the Investment Price Index (IPI) which has always to be calculated 
either when private (PR = 0) or social (PR > 0) price is considered. Secondly, if the social point of 
view has to be considered, the calculation of R&D stock user cost (PR > 0) is needed and it requires 
the construction of a Stock Price Index (SPI).    
Many studies still use the GDP deflator or the Consumer Price Index as R&D IPI when no 
alternative index is available  (Morrison and Siegel, 1997; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1989)
8. 
However, it is largely acknowledged that the composition of the research expenditure, in terms 
goods, services, labour and capital, relevantly differs from the composition of the overall national 
product. The use of the GDP deflator can thus significantly over or underestimate the real R&D 
effort (Mansfield et al., 1983).
9 For agricultural public R&D, Pardey  et al. (1989) and Bengston 
(1989) define an appropriate IPI based upon expenditures composition of the State Agricultural 
Experimental Stations. Here, we follow their idea, although we refer to the specific Italian public 
agricultural R&D structure and data.
10   
Two different sources of public agricultural R&D are considered: public universities (U) and 
other public institutions (O)
11, each with three different R&D input categories: labour (research and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
7 The command used is LSQ of TSP 4.5, whose option HETERO computes standard errors which are consistent even 
in the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). 
8  Using the GDP deflator as research IPI is frequent also in the official R&D statistics, as in the Italian case. 
9 The research IPI calculated by Mansfield (1984; 1987) rises more than the GDP deflator, and this result is confirmed 
by other analogous studies (Griliches, 1984; Nadiri and Kim, 1996).  Both the deflators by Mansfield and Jaffe-
Griliches (on which the Nadiri and Kim study is based) are based on an ad hoc survey on manufacturing firms; 
dealing with the public R&D capital, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) use the price deflator of the government purchases 
of goods and services. 
10  In the Italian case own private agricultural R&D is substantially negligible (Esposti, 2000; Esposti and Pierani, 
2000); therefore the whole R&D stock can be regarded as a public good freely disposable to farmers. By assuming 
that R&D is free to farmers, we implicitly disregard any adjustment/adoption costs related to the introduction of new 
technologies generated by the public research effort. This issue may be relevant and can make the public R&D 
someway costly also from the private perspectives. These costs can be, at least partially, taken into account using a 
dynamic specification as in Nadiri and Kim (1996). This may be one possible future extension of the present empirical 
application.  
11  For agricultural research, the Italian University system is almost entirely public.   10
non-research) W, capital (land, buildings and  equipment) S, operating expenses E.
12 Indexing the 
different sources of public research (j = U, O) and the different research inputs (i = W, S, E), we 
can calculate the respective weights  0 j s and 0 ji w on total expenditure in the base year 0.
13  
It follows that the IPI index is: 
(6)  ￿ ￿ =
i it ji j j t P w s IPI 0 0  
where Pi defines the i-th input price. The SPI is affected by the IPI but does not correspond to 
it. In fact, the implicit R&D stock price is given by the current value of all the services it can 
provide in the future. This user cost is determined by three components (Caiumi et al., 1995; Nadiri 
and Kim, 1991): the opportunity cost of the invested money, capital gains or losses caused by 
inflation, and capital depreciation. Jorgenson (1989) proposes, for physical capital, a specification 
of the user cost that can be written as follows: 
(7)  SPI t = IPIt-1[rt - p t+ (1+p t)r t] 
where r is the interest rate, p is the expected capital gain (or loss) rate due to inflation, and r is the 
R&D stock depreciation rate. In equation (7), Pt-1(it-p t) expresses in real terms the opportunity 
cost of a unit of invested capital, while Pt-1(1+p t)rt is the depreciation corrected for inflation. 
                                                             
12 The respective deflators are derived has follows: the salary deflator of the Ministry of Education is used for W (until 
1990, the public University system was in charge of this  Ministry); the investment price deflator of agricultural 
investment (Caiumi et al., 1995) is adopted for S; the GNP deflator is used for E. The IPI for the Italian public 
agricultural R&D is then computed with a Laspeyres formula. as both weights (for the R&D sources and inputs) are 
not available on an annual basis. So, the price indexes have to be calculated using fixed weights. The input price 
indices are assumed equal for both U and O 
























0  where P defines 
the price and X the quantity, respectively.   11
Evidently, if the IPI significantly differs from the GDP deflator, also the SPI calculated with the 
IPI will significantly differ from the stock price calculated using the GDP deflator.
14  
 
4.  Data and estimation results 
All the data, except the R&D investments, are taken from the AGRIFIT database for the Italian 
agriculture (Caiumi et al., 1995). The public agriculture R&D investments include all the public 
expenditure and are described in Esposti and Pierani (2000) and in section 3. The R&D stock series 
have been calculated from the investment series using the parameters calculated in Esposti and 
Pierani (2002) where also the R&D stock depreciation rate for the calculation of the SPI is 
reported.
15  
The estimated GL restricted cost function is monotonic in W and Y (non-decreasing) and the 
two stocks (non-increasing), concave in prices and convex in capital and knowledge stock at all 
sample points
16. The R
2 goodness of fit varies between 0. 0.35 for animal input demand and 0. 96 
for labour demand.  
Table 1 reports variable input and shadow price elasticities
17. On the whole, input use is 
more responsive to scale of production than prices, so that short run changes in factor proportions 
mainly depend on output level. Own- and cross-price coefficients are accurately estimated and 
much smaller than unity, which imply a rather rigid structure. Cross effects show that hired labor 
                                                             
14 Comparing the real public R&D investments in Italian agriculture deflated with the IPI and with the GDP deflator 
confirms previous results (Griliches, 1984): the GDP d eflator overestimates the real research investment increase;  
during the period 1960-1995, the R&D stock grew by ten times when the GDP deflator is used and “only” by 6 times 
using the IPI.   
15 Inflation and interest rates are taken from AGRIFIT. For the calculation of the IPI, the salary index for the labour has 
been taken from Franco (1993), while the investment price index comes from AGRIFIT. The fixed weights among 
research sources and inputs have been taken from ISTAT. We adopt the weights average of years 1984, 1985, 1986. 
These data, and the following econometric analysis, cover the period 1960-1995. 
16 Parameter estimates are not reported here; however they are available upon request. 
17 Given that results do not show marked variations, for the sake of space we discuss only sample mean estimates. The 
value of PR does not affect short-run elasticities but only long run results. Long run elasticities, not reported here, are 
available upon request. In estimation, analytical derivatives and approximated standard errors are obtained through the   12
substitutes for the other two inputs that, in turn, behaves as complement.  
The table also reports elasticities with respect to output and quasi-fixed inputs. In particular, VC 
substitutes for both stocks, V A is complement to both physical capital and research. VL is substitute 
for physical capital, as expected, while is complement to public R&D stock. However, the latter 
effect, though statistically significant, is almost negligible.  
For the symmetry relationships pertaining to the twice continuos differentiability of cost 
functions we have that quasi-fixed input demand elasticities and shadow price elasticities do share 
similar information
18. Concerning research shadow price, an increase (decrease) in WC or WL (WA), 
ceteris paribus, induces an increase in the desired stock, thus increasing its utilisation. Moreover, 
the R&D shadow price elasticity with respect to the physical capital stock, signals substitutability 
between the two stocks. Together with the complementarity between R&D and labour, this result 
suggests that the innovations generated by public R&D are not prevalently embodied in new 
vintage physical capital but, rather, favour labour-using techniques. 
The interpretation of technical change and change in input use induced by R&D can be 
associated to exogenous technical change. Table 2 reports the residual productivity growth measure 
and related input biases. The exogenous technical change rate is quite high (yearly 3.9% on 
average)
19 and also significantly affects input use: the estimated exogenous technical change uses 
the inputs for animal production (.037) and for crops (.035) while saves labour (-.011). This latter 
bias largely offsets the labour use effect induced by public R&D.  
Table 3 assembles the short-run capacity utilisation measures discussed in section 2. Since the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
TSP commands DIFFER and ANALYZ, respectively. 









are the input shares on shadow cost C
*, and jki gives the impact of Wi on the quasi rent of stock k.  
19  This is the exogenous technical change measured as rate of reduction of the short run cost, i.e. ¶lnG/¶t and reported 
in table 2 as the weighted sum of the variable inputs growth rates.    13
dual measure CUC clearly inverts its pattern (from >1 to <1) around 1983 (figure 1), these measures 
are also calculated for the two subperiods 1960-1983 and 1984-1995. Here, in particular, we are 
interested in the partial utilisation measures, that is the ratio between the observed and the desired 
stock levels, providing evidence about under(over)-investment. Both hypotheses on P R  are 
considered.  Under both hypotheses, observed R&D stock is scarce until the late seventies; during 
this period under-investment is clearly observed from whatever perspective, though it is more 
evident under the private perspective (PR=0). Later on, public R&D stock is in excess, particularly 
when a positive social cost is admitted. Figure 2 clearly shows that actual research expenditure 
follows more closely the long run level implied by costless public R&D. This suggests that the 
recovery from previous underinvestment was overstressed in any case but, in particular, did not 
take into account the proper social cost of the R&D stock provision. However, it must be noticed 
that when the average R&D partial utilisation is calculated over the entire sample, the actual R&D 
stock is much closer to equilibrium under P R>0, whereas, over the whole period, large under-
investment in public R&D is observed when the private (farmers) perspective is maintained.  
Finally, the MIRR can be computed from equations (2) and (3) and the estimated shadow prices 
and elasticities. The calculation is based on a 20-years maximum length of the research effects; 
therefore, period 1976-95 is considered. Table 4 clearly indicates that the returns computed under 
the short run equilibrium are lower than the long run case (under PR>0), which are closer to the 
average estimates reported in the literature though still much lower (Alston et al., 2000). Table 4 
also emphasises how MIRR calculation can be extremely sensitive not only to model specification 
(short or long run equilibrium), but also to the calculation of the R&D user cost. In the extreme 
case, when the long run equilibrium levels and private perspective (free R&D provision) are 
considered, a negative MIRR is implicitly assumed.    14
 
5.  Concluding remarks  
This paper aims to analyse the role of the public R&D investments in agricultural production 
with specific reference to the Italian case. The study uses an econometric model taking into account 
the public good nature of this input as well its endogenous long run optimal level. This model 
allows to explicitly test the hypothesis of over or under-investment in public agricultural R&D and 
the effect of alternative specifications of the research price. The appropriate calculation of the R&D 
stock price requires detailed information about the s ources and composition of the research 
spending. In this direction, further research effort in data analysis and construction is needed.     
The empirical application suggests that under-investment in public R&D can be observed when 
the private (farmers) perspective is considered, thus reverting the traditional argument in favour of 
the under-investment hypothesis in new growth economics literature. In fact, from the farmers 
point of view R&D behaves as a free input in the long run and the actual R&D provision falls 
short; this also implicitly means assuming a negative marginal internal rate of returns to public 
R&D in the long run. When the social planner point of view is considered, under-investment 
eventually vanishes and the actual public R&D provision is very close to the optimal one, at least 
considering the whole sample average. On the one hand, these results emphasize how, when public 
R&D is considered, the hypothesis of R&D underinvestment critically depends on the chosen 
perspective, that is on the R&D user cost leading the investment optimal choice. On the other hand, 
they also signal how strongly the estimation of the rate of return can depend on R&D price 
specification and on the underlying assumptions.   
   15
References  
Aghion, P., Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative destruction. Econometrica, 
60 (March), 323-351. 
Alston, J.M., Marra, M.C., Pardey, P.G.  e Wyatt, T.J. (2000). Research returns redux: A meta-
analysis of the returns  to agricultural R&D. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, Vol. 44, 185-215. 
Barnes, A.P. (2001). Towards a framework for justifying public agricultural R&D: the example 
of UK agricultural research policy. Research Policy, 30, 663-672.  
Bengston, D.N. (1989). A price index for deflating state agricultural experiment station research 
expenditures. The Journal of Agricultural Economics Research, 41 (4), 12-20. 
Caiumi, A., Pierani, P., Rizzi, P.L., Rossi, N. (1995). AGRIFIT: una banca dati del settore 
agricolo (1951-1991). Franco Angeli, Milano. 
Chambers, R.G. (1988): Applied Production Analysis. A Dual Approach. Cambridge University 
Press, cambridge. 
Chavas, J.P., Aliber, M.. T.L. Cox (1997). An Analysis of the Source and Nature of Technical 
Change: the Case of U.S. Agriculture. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(3), 482-492.   
Cohen, W.M., Levin, R.C. (1991). Empirical studies of innovation and market structure. In: 
Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D. (eds.), Handbook of industrial organisation. Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science, chapter 18.   
Echeverria, R. (ed.) (1990). Methods for diagnosing research system constraints and assessing 
the impact of agricultural research. The Hague: ISNAR   
Esposti, R. (2000). The impact of public R&D and Extension expenditure on Italian agriculture. 
An Application of a Mixed Parametric/Nonparametric Approach. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 27 (3), 365-384. 
Esposti, R. (2002). Public agricultural R&D design and technological spill-ins. A dynamic 
model. Research Policy, 31 (5), 693-717.  
Esposti, R., Pierani, P. (2000).  Modelling Technical change in Italian Agriculture: a Latent 
Variable Approach. Agricultural Economics, Vol. 22, n. 3, pp. 261-270. 
Esposti, R. e Pierani, P. (2002). Building the knowledge stock: lags, depreciation and uncertainty 
in R&D  investment and link to productivity growth.  Journal of Productivity Analysis 
(forthcoming).  
Evenson, R.E. (2001).  Economic impacts of agricultural research and extension. In: Gardner-  16
Rausser (eds.): Handbook of Agricultural Economics-Vol. 1A, North-Holland, 573-628.   
Franco, D. (1993). L’espansione della spesa pubblica in Italia. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Griliches, Z. (1984). R&D, Patents and Productivity, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.    
Griliches, Z. (1992). The search for R&D spillovers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, 
29-47. 
Griliches, Z., Lichtenberg, F. (1984a). R&D and productivity growth at the industry level: is 
there still a relationship? In Grilcihes, Z. (ed.): R&D, patents and productivity, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 465-496.   
Griliches, Z., Lichtenberg, F. (1984b). Interindustry technology flows and productivity growth: 
a re-examination, notes. Review of Economics and Statistics, 66 (2), 324-329. 
Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E. (1991).  Innovation and growth in the global economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Hall, B.H. (1996). The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development: What Have 
We Learned? In: Smith, B. L. R., Barfield C.E. (eds.), Technology, R&D, and the Economy, 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute. 
Harris, M., Lloyd, A. (1991). The Returns to Agricultural Research and the Underinvestment 
Hypothesis. A Survey. Australian Economic Review, 95, July-Sept. 1991, 16-27.    
Johnson,  D.K., Evenson, R.E. 1999.  R&D spillovers to agriculture: Measurement and 
application. Contemporary Economic Policy, vol. 17, no. 4, 432-456. 
Jones, C.I. (1995). R&D-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 103 
(4), 759-84.  
Jones, C.I., Williams, J.C. (1998). Measuring the social return to R&D. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113 (4), 1119-1135. 
Jones, C.I., Williams, J.C. (2000). Too much of a good thing? The economics of investment in 
R&D. Journal of Economic Growth, 5 (1), 65-85.  
Mansfield, E. (1984). R&D and innovation: some empirical findings. In Z. Griliches,  R&D, 
Patents and Productivity, National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.    
Mansfield, E. (1987). Price indexes for R&D inputs, 1969-1983. Management Science, 33 (1), 
124-129.    
Mansfield, E., Romeo, A., Switzer, L. (1983). R&D price indices and real R&D expenditures in   17
the United States. Research Policy, 12 (2), 105-112.    
Morrison, C.J. (1988). Quasi-Fixed Inputs in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing: A Generalized 
Leontief Restricted Cost Function Approach. Review of Economics and Statistics, 70, 275-287. 
Morrison, C.J., Schwartz, A.J. (1996). State infrastructure and productive performance.  The 
American Economic Review, vol. 86, n.5,1095-1111. 
Morrison, C.J., Siegel, D. (1997). External factors and increasing returns in U.S. manufacturing. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 79, n. 4, 647-654. 
Morrison, C.J., Siegel, D. (1998). Knowledge capital and cost structure in the US food and fiber 
industries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 80 (1), 30-45. 
Nadiri, M.I. (1993). Innovations and technological spillovers. NBER Working Paper No. 4423. 
Nadiri, M.I., Mamuneas, T.P. (1994). The Effects of Public Infrastructure and R&D Capital on 
the Cost Structure and Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 76(1), 22-37. 
Nadiri, M.I., Mamuneas, T.P. (1996).  Public R&D policies and cost behaviour of the US 
manufacturing industries. Journal of Public Economics, 63 (1), 57-81.  
Nadiri, M.I., Prucha, I.R. (1996). Estimation of the depreciation rate of physical and R&D 
capital in the U.S. total manufacturing sector, Economic Inquiry, 34(1), 43-56.  
Pardey, P.G., Craig, B., Hallaway, M.L. (1989). U.S. agricultural research deflators: 1890-
1985. Research Policy, 18 (5), 289-296.  
Pierani, P., Rizzi, P.L., 1994.  Equilibrio di breve periodo, utilizzazione della capacità e 
produttività totale dei fattori nell’agricoltura italiana (1952-1991). Discussion Paper,  13, 
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Siena. 
Romer, P.M. (1990). Endogenous technical change. Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), S71-
102.  
Scherer, F.M. (1982).  Inter-industry technology flows and productivity growth.  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 64 (4), 627-634. 
Schimmelpfenning, D., Thirtle, C., van Zyl, J., Arnade, C., Khatri, Y. (2000). Short and long-
run returns to agricultural R&D in South Africa, or will the real rate of return please stand up? 
Agricultural Economics, 23, 1-15. 
 Terleckyj, N. (1980). Direct and indirect effects of industrial research and development on the 
productivity growth of industries. In: Kendrick, J.W., Vaccara, B.N. (eds.): New developments in 
productivity measurement and analysis, Chicago: The University of Chigaco Press, chapter 6.   18
Thirtle, C., Bottomley, P. (1989). The rate of return to public sector agricultural R&D in the UK, 
1965-80. Applied Economics, 21, 1063-1086. 
Thirtle, C., Bottomley, P. (1988). Is publicly funded agricultural research excessive? Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 39, 99-111. 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 721-746. 
Yee, J. (1992). Assessing rates of return to public and private agricultural research. Journal of 
Agricultural Economics Research, 44 (1), 35-41. 
   19
 
Table 1: Short run demand elasticity and shadow prices flexibility  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 
  WA  WC  WL  XR  XK  Y 




























































* Statistically significant at 95% 
 
Table 2: Capacity Utilisation of the R&D and physical capital stocks  
(sample averages) 
PR = 0  PR > 0   
Periods 
  Y Y*   R R X X /
*   K K X X /
*
 
Y Y*   R R X X /





.770  3.263  1.318  .679  1.265  1.554 
1984-95 
 
1.401  .763  .733  1.665   .660  .623 
1960-95 
 
.993  2.424  1.113  1.027  1.060  1.233 
 
Table 3 - Exogenous technical change rate and technological biases  
(sample averages – approximated standard errors in parenthesis) 
  Share  Bias  Growth rate 






















Weighted sum    1  0  -.032* 
(.002) 
* Statistically significant at 95% 
 
Table 4: Marginal internal rate of returns (MIRR) to R&D under alternative hypotheses  
Hypotheses  TRI 
Short run   18% 
Long run (PR > 0)  31% 
Public and private agricultural R&D (avg. of 1772 estimates), Alston et al. (2000)  74% 
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Optimal R&D stock - P>0
Optimal R&D stock - P=0
Actual R&D stock